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Abstract. We describe the design and implementation of a public-key
platform, secFleck, based on a commodity Trusted Platform Module
(TPM) chip that extends the capability of a standard node. Unlike
previous software public-key implementations this approach provides E-
Commerce grade security; is computationally fast, energy efficient; and
has low financial cost — all essential attributes for secure large-scale sen-
sor networks. We describe the secFleck message security services such as
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity, and present performance re-
sults including computation time, energy consumption and cost. This is
followed by examples, built on secFleck, of symmetric key management,
secure RPC and secure software update.
1 Introduction
Wireless sensor network (WSN) applications [6, 12, 1, 2, 21] are growing. While
the importance of security and privacy is generally agreed, it is still largely
ignored since the problem is considered impractical to solve given the limited
computation and energy resources available at node level. In the future, privacy,
authenticity and security will be required for WSN gathered resource utiliza-
tion (for billing purposes), and authenticity and security of WSN management
commands and program downloads. The lesson from the PC industry is that
ignoring security at the outset leads to huge pain when the technology becomes
ubiquitous.
Symmetric (shared) key algorithms are tractable on mote-class hardware and
can achieve message confidentiality. However, key distribution and management
remains a significant practical challenge, and these algorithms poorly support
message authenticity and integrity. On the Internet, Public Key Cryptography
(PKC) is widely used to support symmetric key management, as well as message
authenticity and integrity. Researchers have investigated methods to support PK
technology in WSN [22, 15]. Such approaches have focused on software-based
PK technologies, such as Rivest Shamir Adelman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) but the performance has been poor given the low clock rate
and memory availability. Consequently, a smaller RSA public exponent (e) and a
shorter key size are chosen, which compromises the security level of asymmetric
encryption.
Fig. 1. secFleck TPM module (upper side) — an expansion board for the Fleck WSN
node.
In this paper, we introduce the design and implementation of secFleck, a PK
platform that uses Trusted Platform Module (TPM) hardware to augment the
node. Our evaluation shows that the secFleck provides Internet-level PK services
with reasonable energy consumption and financial overhead. The contributions
of this paper include:
– The design and implementation of the secFleck platform, which includes a
standard TPM chip and a set of software primitives, to support Public Key
Cryptography (PKC) in a WSN. To the best of our knowledge, the secFleck is
the first platform that supports most RSA-based PKC functions (encryption,
decryption, signature, and signature verification) in WSN. RSA is the most
widely used PKC in the traditional networks such as the Internet.
– Extensive evaluation of the secFleck platform in terms of computation time,
energy consumption, memory footprint and cost. The results demonstrate
the feasibility of the secFleck platform.
– The demonstration that the secFleck platform is easy-to-use through case
studies of how to implement key management, secure software update, and
secure Remote Procedure Calls (RPC) services using the secFleck primitives.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give a brief
overview of the RSA algorithm, which secFleck is based on, followed by a detailed
description of the software and hardware architecture of secFleck (Section 3).
We evaluate the performance of secFleck in terms of computation time, energy
consumption and financial cost in Section 4. Section 5 describes, by means of a
case study, how secFleck primitives can be used to implement state-of-the-art
key management and secure software update protocol, and improve the proto-
col’s performance. We present related work in Section 6. Finally, we finish with
conclusions and future work in Section 7.
2 A brief introduction to the RSA algorithm
In this section, we provide an overview of the Rivest Shamir Adelman (RSA)
algorithm [18], which secFleck is motivated by and built upon. We will also
discuss some RSA terms and parameters, such as modulus (n), random numbers
(p and q), public exponents (e) and key sizes (k), and their implications to the
RSA algorithm computation complexity and security levels.
RSA is an algorithm for public key cryptography (PKC), also called asym-
metric cryptography, in which the encryption key is different to the decryption
key. RSA is the first algorithm that is suitable for signing and encryption, and is
used widely in secure communication protocols, such as Secure Shell (SSH) and
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), in the Internet.
The RSA algorithm generates a public key and a private key simultaneously
as follows. First, RSA chooses two large random numbers p and q. Second, RSA
calculates the product (n) of p and q: n = pq, where n is used as the modulus
for RSA public and private keys.
Third, RSA calculates the Euler’s totient function of n, given by: ϕ(n) =
(p − 1)(q − 1). Fourth, RSA chooses an integer (e, also called public exponent)
such that:
1 < e < ϕ(n), (1)
and
gcd(e, ϕ(n)) = 1, (2)
where gcd stands for the Greatest Common Divisor (GCD). Public exponent (e)
and modulus (n) together comprise the public key.
Fifth, RSA calculates private exponent (d) by
de ≡ mod ϕ(n), (3)
where parameters d, p, q are kept secrets.
Since the public key (n, e) of Alice is available to everyone, Bob can then
encrypt a plain text message (m) by
c = me mod n, (4)
where c is the cipher text (cipher) of plain text message m, and 0 ≤ c < n. Only
Alice, the owner of kept secrets (d, p, q), can decrypt the cipher (c) and obtain
plain text message (m) by
m = cd mod n. (5)
Further, with her private key (d, p, q), Alice can use the RSA algorithm to
sign a message by generating a signature (s) by substituting c with a hash value
(H(m)) of m in Eq. (5). After receiving (H(m), s), Bob uses the same hash
function, together with Alice’s public key (n, e), to verify the signature by Eq.
(4).
Because the sizes of p and q are approximately half of the size of the key
size (k), the security level of RSA cryptography is a function of e and k. A
popular choice for the public exponent is e = 216 + 1 = 65, 537. Using small
e values such as 3, 5 or 17 can dramatically reducing computational cost, but
will lead to greater security risks [18]. The default e value in secFleck is 65,537.
It is common to believe that a RSA key size of 512 bits is too small to use
nowadays. Bernstein has proposed techniques that simplify brute-forcing RSA
[3], and other work based on [3] suggests that 1024-bit RSA keys can be broken
in one year by a device that costs $10 million rather than trillions as in previous
predictions [19]. It is currently recommended to use an RSA key at least 2048
bit long. Therefore, the default RSA key size in secFleck is 2048 bits.
3 Platform Architecture
In this section, we discuss both hardware and software modules in secFleck.
3.1 Hardware module
The core of secFleck is an Atmel AT97SC3203S TPM chip (see Fig. 1) mounted
on a Fleck expansion board (see Fig. 2). The TPM chip follows version 1.2 of
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specification for TPM. It has a true Random
Number Generator (RNG), which is Federal Information Processing Standards
(FIPS) 140-2 compliant. By implementing computationally intensive RSA op-
erations in hardware, the TPM chip performs these operations in an efficient
manner. For example, it can compute a 2048-bit RSA signature in 500ms ac-
cording to the Atmel data sheet.
Fig. 1 is a picture of TPM board. The TPM board, connected to a Fleck,
can be enabled to meet WSN application requirements. The TPM board and
the Fleck is shown in Fig. 2. The Fleck is a wireless sensor node that features
an Atmega 1281 micro controller (8 MHz clock rate and 8 KB memory) and
a Nordic nRF905 radio [4]. The TPM module has a 100 kHz SMBus which is
similar to the I2C and the TPM is connected to the Fleck’s I2C interface. The
SMBus makes the TPM chip easily integrated in embedded systems.
Fig. 3 shows a block diagram of the TPM module, which includes the bare
minimum of components required for operation: TPM chip, crystal, oscillator,
voltage regulator, power switch and an expansion connector.
3.2 Software module
For the ease of WSN application developers, we have implemented a set of RSA
public key cryptographic primitives as a Fleck OS (FOS) [4] module, which
include encryption, decryption, signing, and signature verification etc., as well
as XTEA symmetric cryptographic primitives (see Fig. 4). FOS is a C-based
cooperative multi threaded operating system for WSN.
Asymmetric key (RSA) FOS functions Previous research [11] shows that
the primitives, which allow an application to turn a system component on or
off, are important to conserve system energy consumption in sensor networks.
secFleck allows applications to duty cycle TPM component by calling primitives
fos tpm startup() and fos tpm turnoff(). These duty-cycle primitives are
more important in secFleck because its current consumption (around 50 mA) is
significantly more than Fleck’s average current consumption (around 5 mA).
Symmetric keys are typically generated by a pseudo-random number genera-
tor in previous work [14]. If an attacker can extract the initial random symmet-
ric key, then it is possible for the attacker to compute all past and future keys.
Therefore, a high quality random number generator is very important for the
effectiveness of symmetric key operations. secFleck provides a fos tpm rand()
primitive, which is based on a true Random Number Generator (RNG), and is
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2 compliant.
Each TPM has a unique 2048-bit private key established during manufacture
which cannot be read. However an application can acquire the corresponding
public key from the TPM which can be shared with other nodes for encryption
and signature verification purposes. An application encrypts a message by pro-
viding the plain text, the length of the plain text, and a public key — the cipher
text is returned. Similarly, an application can decrypt cipher text. The secFleck
encryption and decryption facilitates message confidentiality.
secFleck provides two additional primitives, i.e., fos tpm sign() and
fos tpm verifySign(), for applications to sign messages or to verify the signa-
tures of messages. The digest parameter in these two primitives are generated
by the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) of plain messages. FOS also provides a
function for computing SHA-1.
A base station typically has more computation, memory and energy resources
and can be treated as a Certificate Authority (CA). All the nodes store the CA’s
public key in their permanent memories such as EEPROM before deployment,
and the base station has the public keys of all nodes. Multiple base stations
and/or dedicated CA nodes with more memory can be used to improve the
scalability of this approach. Therefore, message authenticity can be facilitated.
Fig. 2. secFleck (Fleck3 and TPM module).
Fig. 3. secFleck TPM module block diagram.
Symmetric key (XTEA) FOS functions Previous work [14] show that sym-
metric key cryptography is tractable on mote-class hardware and can achieve
message confidentiality. Further, symmetric key cryptography is significantly less
resource-intensive than asymmetric key cryptography such as RSA. secFleck also
features a 128-bit symmetric block cipher based on eXtended Tiny Encryption
Algorithm (XTEA) [16]. XTEA operates on 64-bit blocks with 32 or 64 rounds.
secFleck chooses XTEA symmetric key cryptography because of its small Ran-
dom Access Memory (RAM) footprint, which makes it a good candidate for tiny
sensor devices that typically have less than 10 KB RAM. XTEA can be used in
an output feedback mode to encrypt or decrypt variable length strings.
4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we discuss the performance of the secFleck platform in terms of
computation time, energy consumption, and financial cost.
4.1 Asymmetric key (RSA) operations
Table 1. Comparison of RSA encryption times.
Public Exponent Software Software Hardware
(e) 1024 bit 2048 bit 2048 bit
3 0.45s 65s N/A
65,537 4.185s 450s 0.055s
1 /* Duty cycle TPM chip functions. */
2 uint8_t fos_tpm_startup(void);
3 uint8_t fos_tpm_turnoff(void);
4
5 /* True random number generator. */
6 uint8_t fos_tpm_rand(uint8_t *randNumber, uint8_t len);
7
8 /* secFleck public key collector. */
9 uint8_t fos_tpm_getPubKey(uint8_t *pubKey);
10
11 /* Asymmetric key encryption/decryption. */
12 uint8_t fos_tpm_encryption(uint8_t *msg, uint16_t len,
13 uint8_t *pubKey, uint8_t *cipher);
14 uint8_t fos_tpm_decryption(uint8_t *cipher, uint8_t *msg,
15 uint16_t *len);
16
17 /* Digital signature and verification. */
18 uint8_t fos_tpm_sign(uint8_t *digest, uint8_t *signature);
19 uint8_t fos_tpm_verifySign(uint8_t *signature, uint8_t *pubKey,
20 uint16_t *digest);
21
22 /* Symmetric session key encryption/decryption. */
23 uint8_t fos_xtea_encipher(uint8_t *msg, uint8_t *key,
24 uint8_t *cipher, uint8_t nRounds);
25 uint8_t fos_xtea_decipher(uint8_t *cipher, uint8_t *key,
26 uint8_t *msg, uint8_t nRounds);
Fig. 4. secFleck application interface for public key infrastructure and symmetric ses-
sion key functions. The public key cryptographic primitive interfaces allow applications
to start up and turn off on-board TPM chip, to read the public key of the TPM chip,
to encrypt or to decrypt a message, to sign a message, and to verify a signature. The
symmetric key primitive interfaces allow applications to encrypt and decrypt messages
by XTEA algorithm.
As part of our benchmarking we also implemented the RSA encryption algo-
rithm in software for comparison. Table 1 shows the encryption time for different
key sizes and RSA public exponents (e) in both software and hardware imple-
mentation. The results show that the TPM chip can reduce the computation
time of RSA encryption by a factor of 8, 000, when e = 65,537 and key size is
2048 bits. Table 1 also shows that software RSA implementation is impractical
using embedded micro controllers such as Atmega 128 when e > 3 and for key
size larger than 1024 bits. A small e will make RSA less secure, and a key size
of 1024 bits will no longer be considered secure in a few years time.
We have not implemented the RSA decryption algorithm in software because
it is significantly more computationally intensive than the RSA encryption al-
Table 2. RSA computation time in secFleck for e = 65, 537 and 2048 bit key.
Encryption Decryption Sign Verification
55ms 750ms 787ms 59ms
gorithm (see Table 2). Table 2 also shows RSA encryption, decryption, sign and
signature verification computation time in secFleck.
Table 3. secFleck current consumption
Module Current (mA)
Fleck3 (without radio, node idle) 8.0
Fleck3 + Receive 18.4
Fleck3 + Transmit 36.8
Fleck3 + TPM encryption 50.4
Fleck3 + TPM decryption 60.8
Fleck3 + TPM signature 60.8
Fleck3 + TPM signature verification 50.4
Table 3 shows the current consumption for different secFleck operations. It
shows that RSA operations consume 37% to 65% more current than transmitting
in secFleck. Table 4 shows the energy consumption of 2048-bit RSA encryption
operation when e = 65, 537. It shows that the software-based approach consumes
around 1,300 times more energy compared to secFleck for an RSA encryption
operation. Table 4 also shows that the software-based approach RSA encryption
in WSN is indeed impractical in terms of both computation time and energy
consumption for reasonable RSA exponent and key size. On the other hand,
secFleck makes it feasible to support PK technology for WSN.
Table 4. secFleck (RSA and XTEA) encryption energy consumption for one bit of
data.
Platform Current (mA) Time (µs) Energy (µJ)
RSA (software, e = 65, 537, 2048 bit key) 8.0 219,730 7,030.0
RSA (hardware, e = 65, 537, 2048 bit key) 50.4 27 5.4
XTEA (software, 128 bit key) 8.0 18 0.6
4.2 Symmetric key (XTEA) operations
We tested the performance of XTEA cryptography to determine its computation
speed on the Fleck platform. secFleck can encrypt one block of 64-bit data in
approximately 1.15 ms. Therefore, it takes approximately 18 µs (Table 4, Row 3)
to encrypt one bit data. Furthermore, the effective data rate of Fleck transceiver
(Nordic nRF905) is 50 kb/s with Manchester encoding. For a 32-byte physical
layer payload, there are a four-byte address and a two-byte Cyclic Redundancy
Check-16 (CRC-16) overheads. Therefore, the available bandwidth for Media
Access Layer (MAC) is 50 × 32 ÷ (32 + 4 + 2) = 42.11 kb/s. It takes 23.75 µs
for a NRF905 transceiver to transmit one bit, which is significantly longer than
the encryption time (17.97 µs).
Table 4 also shows that software symmetric key cryptography is indeed sig-
nificantly faster than hardware RSA asymmetric key cryptography (18 µs vs. 27
µs per bit). Furthermore, XTEA encryption consumes approximately ten times
less energy compared to hardware RSA encryption, and approximately 12,000
times less energy compared to software RSA encryption. It suggests that, in
energy-impoverished WSN, we should use symmetric cryptography for most se-
cure communications, and should use asymmetric cryptography in critical tasks
only (i.e., the symmetric key management).
The other key advantage of XTEA is space efficiency. The FOS XTEA im-
plementation has less than 100 lines of C codes, and requires 52 bytes of RAM
and 1,082 bytes of program space only.
4.3 The financial cost of secFleck
An Atmel AT97SC3203S TPM chip costs $4.5 when ordered in quantities1, which
is less than 5% of the cost of popular sensor devices such as Telosb, Iris mote,
and Fleck (about $100). The TPM chip is small in size (Figure 1) measuring
just 6.1 × 9.7 mm and is less than 2% of the area of the Fleck and could be
integrated onto a future version rather than the cumbersome expansion board
used in this prototype.
5 Case studies
In this section, we demonstrate the power of our secFleck primitives (shown in
Fig. 4) to easily and efficiently realize secure WSN applications. These applica-
tions include, but are not limited to, secure over-the-air programming, secure
Remote Procedure Calls (RPC), and secure session key management. We have
chosen to implement variants of state-of-the-art key management [17] and secure
software update protocol [13] with secFleck primitives, and show how secFleck
primitives can improve the protocol’s performance.
1 http://www.atmel.com/dyn/products/view_detail.asp?ref=&FileName=
embedded10_18.html&Family_id=620 (accessed on 18th June, 2008).
5.1 Symmetric session key encryption/decryption
Symmetric key cryptography consumes significantly less energy than RSA asym-
metric key cryptography (see Table 4), as we envision that symmetric session key
cryptography will be used for most WSN secure communications, and asymmet-
ric cryptography will be used for limited critical tasks. For example, asymmetric
cryptography is used to exchange a new symmetric key daily or hourly (also
called the rekey process). We will discuss the rekey process in detail later.
By utilizing two secFleck primitives, it is easy to achieve symmetric key cryp-
tography in secFleck (see Fig. 5). fos xtea getkey() (Line 4) reads a symmetric
key from secFleck memory, and fos xtea encipher() encrypts a plain message
(msg), and returns an encrypted message (cipher). Therefore, link-level secure
transmissions can be achieved by passing the returned cipher over the radio.
1 #DEFINE NROUNDS 64
2
3 /* XTEA encryption in secFleck. */
4 fos_xtea_getkey(key, location);
5 fos_xtea_storekey(key, location);
6 fos_xtea_encipher(msg, key, cipher, NROUNDS);
Fig. 5. XTEA encryption with secFleck primitives.
An application can choose to store the session keys in Fleck RAM, EEP-
ROM, or the TPM EEPROM. When the keys are stored in the Fleck RAM or
EEPROM, the key (getting and storing) operations consumes significantly less
energy than when the keys are stored in the TPM EEPROM. However, storing
the keys in the Fleck also exposes the keys to more risks. Hartung et al. demon-
strated how to extract the information in a node’s EEPROM and RAM within
one minute in [10]. Perhaps it is better to store the key in the TPM chip for those
infrequent operations (e.g., sending one temperature sample to the base station
every five minutes); store the key in the Fleck memory for those high-throughput
operations (e.g., secure over-the-air-programming).
5.2 Sensor node symmetric session key request/assignment
operation
Fig. 6 shows the protocol for a sensor node (Node A) to request a new symmetric
key from a base station. Node A initiates this process periodically, e.g., hourly or
daily, by generating a random number (Na) and encrypting Na with the Request
(Req) command using Base’s public key (PkBase) before transmitting it to the
base. After receiving the Request message from Node A, the base decrypts the
message with its private key (SKBase). The base then responds to the Req
command by generating a new symmetric session key (KBA), and encrypts it
together withNa using Node A’s public key (PkA) before transmitting it to Node
A. Node A decrypts the message from the Base with its private key (SKA) and
obtains the new symmetric key (KBA). Node A and the base can then use KBA
for future secure communications. Fig. 6 also shows the five secFleck primitives
associated with each step of the key request protocol.
The session key assignment operation is symmetric to the key request oper-
ations. The key assignment protocol is initiated, e.g., in an group key establish-
ment event (see Section 5.3), by the base station instead of a node.
Fig. 6. Symmetric session key request operation with secFleck primitives (underline).
Node A request a session key from a base station.
5.3 Group key establishment operation
Group key establishment can be achieved by a combination of sensor node sym-
metric session key request operations and sensor node symmetric session key
assignment operations. For example, if node A wants to communicate with node
B and C, Node A will request a new group session key from the base station via
the session key request operation introduced in Section 5.2. After receiving the
key request operation from Node A, the base station generates a new symmetric
key (Kabc). The base station assigns Kabc to Node B and C via two session key
assignment operations (see Section 5.2) before transmitting Kabc to Node A.
Then, Node A, B, and C begin secure communications using group session key
Kabc.
5.4 Secure software update protocol
Multihop Over the Air Programming (MOAP) protocols such as Deluge [13] en-
able users to reprogram/retask the WSN remotely, which is critical to efficient
and effective management of large-scale long-duration WSNs. The basic Deluge
protocol works as follows. A node (Node A) advertises its program version peri-
odically. One of its neighbors (Node B) will send a request to download a copy
of the program from Node A if Node B’s version is older than Node A’s. Node A
begins the download process after receiving the request. To support concurrent
data disseminations and reduce network reprograming time, Deluge divides a
program into a number of pages.
By using the group key establishment operation introduced in Section 5.3,
secFleck can provide data confidentiality to Deluge. Furthermore, a base station
can achieve integrity and authentication by signing the advertisement message
and the program pages of Deluge with its private key (SKBase) before dissem-
inating it to the network. After receiving a program page or an advertisement
message, a secFleck node can then verify the page or the advertisement message
with the public key of the base station (PkBase). This mechanism ensures that
wireless bootstrap can only be initiated by an authorized host, that the code
stream is private, and that a page is not committed to flash unless it is from an
authorized host.
A secFleck node can verify the signature of the a 256 byte page in 59 ms (see
Table 2), which is more than 4,300 bytes/second. This secFleck signature verifi-
cation rate is approximately 50 times faster than the average 88.4 bytes/second
dissemination rate achieved by Deluge in a 75 node network [13].
5.5 Backward secrecy and forward secrecy
secFleck can enhance the security levels of the rekey process by providing back-
ward secrecy and forward secrecy. Backward secrecy means that compromising
the current symmetric link key does not allow an attacker to learn previously
recorded messages encrypted with the previous key. Forward secrecy means that
compromising the symmetric link key does not allow an attacker to learn future
communication encrypted with the following key.
A symmetric link key can be found by an attacker by extracting it directly
from a captured node via a JTAG or similar device [10] because of the exposed
nature of nodes in WSN. Furthermore, the attacker can also extract the initial
random key used by the software pseudo-random number generator. This key
allows the attacker to compute all past and future nonces used in the key updat-
ing protocol, which in turn allows the attacker to compute all past and future
keys.
Equipped with a FIPS 140-2 compliant true Random Number Generator
(RNG), secFleck can increase the security level of the protocols. It is very diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for the attacker, who has obtained the current symmetric
link key, to find out the past or future keys generated by a true RNG. An appli-
cation can obtain a true random number by calling fos tpm rand() primitive
(Line 6, Fig. 4).
5.6 Secure Remote Procedure Calls
The Fleck Operating System (FOS) uses Remote Procedure Calls (RPC) to
allow application programs to seamlessly access services on one or more sensor
nodes.
RPC actions Description Cryptography
assign session key assign a new symmetric session key to a node PK
request session key request a new symmetric session key from a base PK
kernel get FOS system memory statistics share
read eeprom read from EEPROM share
read ram read from RAM share
threads get information about threads, label and stack usage share
write eeprom write to EEPROM share
write ram write to RAM share
rtc get get time from the real-time clock share
rtc set set the real-time clock share
txpwr set set radio transmit power share
leds set or toggle LEDs share
power get battery and solar cell status share
Table 5. Common secure FOS RPC actions.
Each node-side service is described by an action file, a C-like function that
supports multiple input and output arguments. A code generator, in Python,
parses all action files and generates a server function and all the serializing
and deserializing code, as well as a Python class to be used by base station
applications. All nodes support the common set of actions listed in Table 5, in
addition to application specific actions.
An RPC call message comprises the function arguments, the function enu-
merator, sequence number, node id of the caller and a CRC-32. Except for the
assign session key and request session key RPC messages, all the other
RPC messages are encrypted using XTEA with the current session key (see Sec-
tion 5.1). assign session key and request session key RPC messages are
encrypted and signed with PKC introduced in Section 5.2. On receipt of an
RPC call message (indicated by the routing header type) the message is de-
crypted using the session key and the CRC-32 checked.
In a sensor network, it is possible to broadcast the RPC call encrypted by a
group symmetric key (see Section 5.3), and have the function executed in parallel
on many nodes which all return their results to the caller. In this case the result
of an RPC call would be a list of return values rather than just one.
Secure RPC, based in secFleck primitives, provides privacy of commands and
return values, authentication and immunity to replay attacks.
6 Related work
In this section, we provide a brief overview of secure communications most di-
rectly relevant to secFleck.
Rivest Shamir Adelman (RSA) is the most widely used Public Key Cryp-
tography (PKC) in the Internet, and a comprehensive guide to RSA is available
in [18]. RSA is much slower than Xtended Tiny Encryption Algorithm (XTEA)
[16] and other (shared) symmetric cryptography such as TinySec [14].
It is our thesis that most of the secure communications in resource-constrained
WSN will be based on symmetric cryptography. A symmetric key can be discov-
ered by an attacker by extracting it directly from a captured node via a JTAG
or similar device [10] because of the distributed and embedded nature of nodes
in WSN. Therefore, an effective symmetric key establishment and management
scheme is of prime importance. RSA and Diffie Hellman key agreement tech-
niques [8] are widely used key agreement protocols in the Internet, but have been
previously considered infeasible for WSNs because of the resource constraints of
sensor devices.
Researchers have proposed a limited version of RSA PKC (TinyPK) that
performs encryption operations only and uses smaller RSA parameters such as
public exponents and key sizes [22]. However, the security levels of RSA cryptog-
raphy is severely compromised by using smaller public exponents and key sizes.
Recently, the importance of symmetric key cryptography and the critical roles
of key management mechanism in WSN was observed by Nilsson et al. [17] who
proposed an efficient symmetric key management protocol for the WSN. How-
ever, they have focused on the protocol design and formal verification, and have
not addressed the resource constraint problems in implementing the protocol.
The research community is developing faster and more energy efficient PKC
algorithms such as Tiny Elliptic Curve Cryptography TinyECC [15] for the
resource-impoverished WSN. While TinyECC shows the most promise to run
at usable speeds on WSN nodes [9], there are concerns related to patents, which
are one of the main factors limiting the widely acceptance of ECC. In this regard
we note that the RSA and XTEA algorithms used in this work is in the public
domain.
While Multihop Over the Air Programming (MOAP) protocols [13] enable
application users to program and reprogram WSNs easily, it also opens the
door for unauthorized users to implant malicious code into the WSN. Dutta et
al. attempt to secure the MOAP [7] by introducing program authenticity and
integrity with a cut-down version of software-based RSA PKC similar to TinyPK
[22]. As in TinyPK, the security levels of RSA cryptography will be compromised
by using smaller RSA public exponents and key sizes.
Believing that PKC such as RSA and ECC is too resource-intensive for the
resource-impoverished WSN, researchers have investigated alternative methods
to ensure program authenticity and integrity by secure hash chain, hash tree
and/or their hybrid [5, 20].
In contrast to the existing alternatives of PKC that typically have limited
functions, secFleck provides E-Commerce level PKC, which facilitates secure
communication services such as confidentiality, authenticity and integrity with
low financial overhead, by exploiting the capability of a commodity Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) chip.
7 Conclusion and future work
We have presented secFleck, a TPM-based PK platform for sensor networks
that facilitates message security services such as confidentiality, authenticity and
integrity. Our evaluation shows that secFleck provides Internet-level public-key
services quickly, with low energy consumption and at low cost in terms of parts
and board size. This is followed by examples, built on secFleck, of symmetric
key management, secure RPC and secure software update, which demonstrates
that the secFleck platform is easy-to-use.
Our next step is to investigate other features of TPM module such as secure
storages and remote attestations.
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